The schooling response to a sustained increase in low-skill wages : evidence from Spain, 1989-2009 by Lacuesta Gabarain, Aitor et al.
THE SCHOOLING RESPONSE 
TO A SUSTAINED INCREASE IN 
LOW-SKILL WAGES: EVIDENCE 
FROM SPAIN 1989-2009
Aitor Lacuesta, Sergio Puente 
and Ernesto Villanueva
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1208
2012
THE SCHOOLING RESPONSE TO A SUSTAINED INCREASE IN LOW-SKILL 
WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 1989-2009
THE SCHOOLING RESPONSE TO A SUSTAINED INCREASE 
IN LOW-SKILL WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 1989-2009 (*)
Aitor Lacuesta, Sergio Puente and Ernesto Villanueva (**)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
(*) We thank seminar audiences at the 2010 EALE meetings in London, the 2010 Simposio of Analisis Economico 
at Madrid, the 2011 SOLE Meetings at Vancouver, the August 2011 Meetings of the Econometric Society at Oslo 
and the 2011 IZA-ESSLE workshop at Buch-am- Ammersee. For their helpful comments we would like to thank 
Ana Rute Cardoso, Giacomo de Giorgi, Juan Francisco Jimeno, Laura Hospido, Francis Kramarz, Josep Pijoan 
and Nuria Rodriguez-Planas. Mario Izquierdo provided very useful help with the Registry of Collective Agreements 
Database. All views and opinions are our own.
(**) Corresponding author: ernesto.villanueva@bde.es.
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1208
2012
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.  
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2012
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)
Abstract
The response of human capital accumulation to changes in the anticipated returns to 
schooling determines the type of skills supplied to the labor market, the productivity of 
future cohorts, and the evolution of inequality. Unlike the US, the UK or Germany, Spain has 
experienced since 1995 a drop in the returns to medium and tertiary education and, with a 
lag, a drop in schooling attainment of recent cohorts, providing the opportunity to estimate 
the response of different forms of human capital acquisition to relative increases in low-skill 
wages. We measure the expected returns to schooling using skill-specifi c wages bargained 
in collective agreements at the province-industry level. We argue that those wages are 
easily observable by youths and relatively insensitive to shifts in the supply of workers. 
Our preferred estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the ratio of wages of unskilled 
workers to the wages of mid-skill workers increases the fraction of males completing at 
most compulsory schooling by between 2 and 5 percentage points. The response is driven 
by males from less educated parents and comes at the expense of students from the 
academic high school track rather than the vocational training track.
Keywords: Collective bargaining, human capital.
JEL classifi cation: J52, J24.
Resumen
La respuesta del capital humano ante cambios de la estructura salarial tiene implicaciones 
sobre la evolución de la productividad del trabajo. En España han caído tanto los 
rendimientos salariales de distintas formas de educación como el nivel educativo de las 
cohortes nacidas tras 1976. Este documento utiliza datos de la Encuesta de Población 
Activa entre 1992 y 2009 y del Registro de Convenios Colectivos para estimar la respuesta 
del capital humano ante cambios en la estructura salarial percibida por los jóvenes a los 17 
años de edad. Los rendimientos salariales de la educación se miden utilizando los salarios 
negociados para cada nivel de cualifi cación en convenios de ámbito provincial y sectorial, 
ya que estos son fácilmente observables y, como se documenta, varían poco ante cambios 
en la oferta de trabajo de los jóvenes. Un aumento relativo de los salarios de los peones 
del 10% aumenta la proporción de varones con educación obligatoria entre 2 y 5 puntos 
porcentuales, a costa de la proporción de jóvenes que acaban el bachillerato. La respuesta 
se debe principalmente a los varones cuyas familias tienen un menor nivel educativo.
Palabras claves: Negociación colectiva, capital humano.
Códigos JEL: J52, J24.
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1 Introduction
The response of human capital to changes in anticipated returns to schooling
determines the productivity of future cohorts in the labor market and the evolu-
tion of inequality. For example, the fact that college enrolment among US young
adults has not kept up with the increase of the returns to college has led some
authors to forecast an increase in wage inequality during the next decades (see
Altonji et al., 2008). Unlike other advanced economies, including the United
States, the United Kingdom or Germany, Spain has experienced since the mid-
90s a drop both in the returns to medium and tertiary education (see Lacuesta
and Izquierdo, 2012 or Pijoan and Sanchez-Marcos, 2010) and, as we document
below, a drop in the schooling attainment of recent cohorts measured at the
age of 25. Hence, the Spanish case provides an ideal setup to estimate how the
decisions of young adults to accumulate human capital in the schooling system
respond to increases in low-skill wages relative to high-skill ones.
The basic model of human capital acquisition stresses the role of the ex-
pected return to skill acquisition as a key determinant of the decision to enrol
in formal education. In the absence of credit constraints, the opportunity cost
of attending school relative to expected returns of acquiring formal skills deter-
mines the supply of human capital in an economy. On the empirical side, there
is evidence that young adults’ enrolment probabilities decrease with the wages
of unskilled workers — Sanders et al. (2005) Neumark and Wascher (1995) —the
unemployment rate —Clark (forthcoming), Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003, Petron-
golo or San Segundo, 2002- or proxies for the demand in industries intensive
in unskilled labor —Aparicio, 2010. Unfortunately, while enrolment is a very
important outcome, it provides little information about the type of skills finally
acquired in the formal education system. Firstly, early school leaving decisions
may be later compensated by other forms of human capital acquisition, such as
GEDs in the US. Secondly, the evolution of productivity depends on the level
of schooling finally attained by an individual, not on point-in-time enrolment
decisions. Interesting empirical evidence about the impact of increases in the
returns to human capital on schooling attainment is documented by Abramitzky
and Lavy (2011), who use a change in the compensation policy in Israeli kib-
butzim to estimate the response of high school completion to changes in the
returns to human capital.
Our study estimates how the drop and subsequent increase of the relative
wages of unskilled workers in Spain between 1986 and 2009 has affected the
form of human capital acquired by youths. We start by documenting that,
similarly to the development in the US and other OECD countries, the schooling
attainment of male Spanish citizens has stagnated during the last 15 years —see
Autor and Dorn, 2010, or Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2010. Secondly, we
provide evidence that wages in low-skilled jobs, relative to those in mid-skilled
ones, experienced a sustained increase after 1995 - after a fall between 1987 and
1992. The wages in the jobs, held by mid-skill workers, relative to those held by
college workers, stagnated after 1995. Both developments in the wage structure
were sustained over time, thus making it likely for young adults to infer that the
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movements in the relative wages of unskilled workers had indeed a permanent
component and were likely to shape the decision to acquire human capital.
We focus on the educational decisions right after the legal working age- 16
years. Spain has a dual track schooling system and young adults who continue
studying can either choose the vocational track - a professionally oriented track
involving training in firms- or an academic track - with an academic curricu-
lum and that constitutes the main way to college. Completion of both tracks
implies supplying very different skills to the labor market. Hence, we consider
the following choices of the youth at age 17: (a) finishing at most compulsory
schooling, (b) enrolling and finishing the vocational track and (c) engaging in the
academic track. To mitigate the biases associated to the simultaneity between
the quantity of unskilled workers entering the labor market and the relative
changes in unskilled wages, we measure the wage structure perceived by youths
at the age of 17 using skill-specific wages determined in collective agreements at
the province-industry level. That strategy is motivated by three observations.
Firstly, unskilled and skilled young adults work in different industries. Un-
skilled young men typically work in construction and retail, while skilled young
men work in services to industries, health and education. Secondly, due to a
boom that has lasted some 10 years, the construction sector has experienced
higher-than-average wage growth. Thirdly, wages set in collective agreements
effectively act as minimum wages at the province-industry cell level. Those
wages are downwardly rigid for years and legally binding for all employers in
the scope of the agreement -regardless of the degree of unionization at the firm
level. We document that collectively bargained wages affect the distribution
of wages: there is substantial concentration in the wages of the youth around
collectively bargained wages for unskilled workers and they correlate with wage
growth at the province level. We also show that the variation in wages set
in collective agreements does not reflect the outside opportunities of unskilled
youth in the province-measured by the age-specific unemployment rate. Hence,
we construct several measures of the return to skill anticipated at age 17 by
combining public information on skill-specific collective bargained wages across
industries and the industrial share of young employment in the province before
the last construction boom.1
We document the following set of results. A 10 percent increase in the
relative wages of unskilled workers leads cohorts that turn 17 to be between
2 and 5 percentage points more likely to complete basic education at most.
The result depends on whether or not we adjust for unemployment differences
across skill levels. In our preferred specification, the increase in the share of
male youths with basic schooling comes at the expense of the share of male
youth with academic high school track and is most pronounced among males
whose parents have lower levels of schooling. We also provide some evidence
1Our strategy then departs from Abramitzky and Lavy (2011) in two main aspects. First,
we focus on economy-wide changes and investigate if youths respond to those changes. Sec-
ondly, we exploit the dual track educational system in Spain and analyze the impact of changes
in the wage structure on the final form of human capital acquired (vocational vs academic
high school tracks).
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suggesting that young adults responded to the increase in unskilled wages by
leaving the educational system at the early stages of tertiary education. We
find weaker schooling response to the relative increase of unskilled wages among
females, a finding that could be due to wage increases below construction in the
industries where unskilled females work.
Section 2 provides some background on schooling and wages in Spain. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data and methods. Section 4 shows the results when we use
market wages and Section 5 shows the results of our preferred empirical strat-
egy when we use measures of the return to skill based on wages in collective
agreements. Section 6 concludes.
2 Trends in Wages and Schooling in Spain
This Section provides the basic facts about educational attainment and the wage
structure that each cohort observes at the age of 17.
2.1 The Educational System and trends in schooling at-
tainment.
Spain features a dual track system. Once a young adult finishes compulsory
education, he or she has two options. The first is to enter the academic track
that, upon completion, gives access to college. The second is vocational train-
ing (Formación Profesional), a more professionally-oriented track that involves
training in firms and trains for specific occupations. For almost all cohorts in
our study (born between 1969 and 1983), compulsory schooling ended at age 14.
After that age youth could opt for leaving the system altogether, or for entering
either the academic or the vocational training tracks.
The Academic track consisted of three grades, with common curricula dur-
ing the first two years and partial choice of subjects during the last one. An
additional grade gave plus passing a national-level exam gave access to college.
The Vocational training track consisted of three levels (or “modules”). The
first two were assimilated to secondary schooling, and each of them took two
years to complete. The third one also took two years and is assimilated to
tertiary education by the definition of Eurostat and the OECD.
A new Educational Act passed in 1990 but introduced in 1993 (LOGSE
law 14/1990) extended compulsory education until age 16. It maintained the
first two grades of the academic and the vocational tracks in the former system
as secondary education, but as “compulsory” secondary education. Access to
tertiary education or the composition of the last two grades of the vocational
training remained unchanged. What cohorts would be affected by that change?
The law specified that those who were attending 3rd and 4th degree of primary
education in 1993 were to initiate 3rd and fourth degree of the “new” primary
education. In principle, and according to such legislation, the first birth cohort
completely affected by the new legislation would then be the one born in 1984
the second-to-last cohort in our study. Many schools, however changed before
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and even in the case of a late change, some individuals born before could have
been affected by the reform if they repeated some grade. Hence, as we lack
information about the share of students whose school anticipated the law change,
we create a taxonomy of grades that is consistent over time, and discuss if
legislative changes are likely to affect our measures of schooling attainment.
Namely, for the purpose of documentation of trends we distinguish between
• Primary Schooling or Less: We include here young adults who completed
at most primary schooling under any of the systems. We include in this
category individuals who fail to complete “compulsory” schooling, a group
that constitutes a non-trivial fraction of the population, reaching 30% for
cohorts born after 1985.
• Upper secondary school : This group includes all young adults who com-
pleted at least high school (in the academic track) in either the old or the
new systems Young adults in this group failed to finish education without
a tertiary education degree.
• Vocational training : Young adults who complete any form of vocational
training under both systems.
• Tertiary education: Young adults who complete some form of college
Figure 1a shows the evolution of the educational attainment for male young
adults born between 1967 and 1983, measured as of age 25 in the EPA Spanish
Labor Force Survey. Figure 1 documents a rapid increase in the educational
attainment across cohorts born in the early seventies. The fraction of male
young adults born in 1967 who completed primary school only was over 50%.
That fraction dropped to 38% among the cohort of males born in 1977. Corre-
spondingly, the 1977 cohort had a fraction of youth with a vocational training
degree or upper secondary school 4 and 5 percentage points higher than the 1967
cohort, with college attainment also increasing by some 9 percentage points.
Nevertheless, that upward trend in attainment was reversed among cohorts
born in the late seventies and early eighties. Male young adults born after 1977
have not attained higher degrees of college or upper secondary schooling than
the 1977 cohort. While such pattern might partly reflect that individuals are
attending longer university degrees over time, the stagnation in educational at-
tainment is especially evident in lower levels of schooling: the fraction of young
males who have attained basic education or less after the 1980 cohort has stag-
nated and even increased for the last three cohorts in the graph. Figure 1b shows
the evolution for females. While less stark, Figure 1b also documents stagnation
of the levels of female youths completing at most compulsory schooling.
2.2 Trends in Wage Structure at age 17
Figure 2 displays a series of the returns to skill that cohorts could observe
at the age of 17. The construction of these series is detailed in Section 4.2,
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but we provide here an overview. We computed for each of the 50 provinces
in Spain the median of the wage of unskilled workers -those classified by the
Social Security system “laborers”- between the ages 16 and 45. We performed
a similar computation for workers with some skill level that is inferior to college
(ages 25-45) and the wages of workers in positions that require college (ages
25-45). Figure 2 plots the national averages of the ratio of the wage of unskilled
workers to mid-skill ones ( WunskilledWmid_skill ) and the ratio of mid-skill workers to
college (Wmid_skillWcollege ). The horizontal axis has the birth year of the cohort and
the vertical axis contains the ratio of unskilled-to mid-skill wages prevailing the
year when the cohort turned 17.
According to our measure, the cohorts born between 1969 and 1977 would
have observed a drop in relative wages of unskilled and mid-skill workers. When
the cohort born in 1969 turned 17 —year 1986- the ratio between the median
wage of unskilled workers and the median of mid-skill workers was 76%. Ten
years later, at the time of taking the decision of whether or not to finish upper
secondary school, the 1977 cohort observed an equivalent ratio of 69%. Since
then, each cohort of males has been observing a secular increase in the relative
wage of unskilled workers. The remainder of this study uses several methods
to assess whether or not the evolution of wages observed at age 17 may have
caused the trends in schooling attainment depicted in Figure 1.
3 Methods
We assume that a risk neutral youth lives for three periods. Period 1 represents
ages 16-19. In that period young adults can either work as an unskilled worker
or, alternatively, continue accumulating human capital in either the academic
or the vocational track of high school. Period 2 represents ages 20-24, the time
when a youth that has successfully completed vocational training can start his
or her working life. Meanwhile, a youth who completed the academic track
would be attending college. The third period represents age 24+, when returns
to college start being reaped.
Leaving the schooling system at 16 allows earning the stream of earnings
wu(1 +
1
R +
1
R2 ). where R is the market interest rate. Going to the vocational
track involves giving up earnings between 16 and 19 and start earning the stream
wv(
1
R +
1
R2 ). Successful high school completion permits access to college in
the second period and, if the young adult succeeds in college, a wage in the
third period of wc 1R2 .
2The outcome of the high school route is uncertain. With
probability p the young adult graduates from college. Otherwise, he or she
obtains a fraction κ of the earnings in vocational training. We set κ = 1.
The utility function of each of the choices is Uu = wu[1 +
β
R +
β2
R2 ],where
β measures either patience or the relative preference for current consumption
-because of family need or other factors. The utility of vocational training is
2We usewu
wv
in the model to term what we called Wunskilled
Wmid_skill in the data, and
wv
wcol
to
denote the ratio Wmid_skill
W col lege
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1208
the stream of earnings plus the utility from performing professional tasks -an
idiosyncratic component that may vary across individuals.
Uvoc = wv[
β
R
+
β2
R2
] +
β
R
S
Finally, the utility of the academic track is Ucol = β
2p(wcolR2 )+(1−p)βwv( 1R+
1
R2 ) -
We further assume that there are returns to any type of human capital
investment. That is, the discounted lifetime earnings of a college graduate
exceed the lifetime earnings associated to vocational training and those, in turn,
exceed lifetime earnings of unskilled workers:
wcol
R2
> wv(
1
R
+
1
R2
) > wu[1 +
1
R
+
1
R2
]
The choice of whether or not continue studying at age 16 depends on the
alternative earnings stream. The tradeoff between the academic high school and
the vocational training depends on the difference between the wage return of
college -net of the cost of foregoing the vocational training wage in the second
period- and the preference for professional jobs, or
S
wv
= p[
βΔvwcol −R
R
] (VT -A)
where Δvwcol = wcolwv − 1. The indifference between vocational training and
leaving the schooling system altogether also reflects a trade-off between the
advantage of getting wages in the first period and starting vocational training,
that yields the discounted professional taste for the job on top to a future wage
return.
β
R
[
S
wv
+Δuwv(1 +
β
R
)] =
wu
wv
(VT - DO)
Here, Δuwv = wvwu − 1.Finally, students considering whether to take the
academic high school or leaving the educational system have to balance the
opportunity cost of studying and the wage return of the academic track, that
includes the possibility of accessing college wages or, at a minimum, discounted
earnings of the professional track:
[
β
R
+
β
R
]Δuwv + p[
βΔuwcol − 1−R
R
] = 1 (A-DO)
Figure A.1.illustrates these choices in the {β, Swv } space when R equals 1
and p is fixed-see Appendix 2 for details. Students with a high level of β and
relatively low Swv choose the academic track. For values of β below
1
Δvwcol
, all
youths drop out. Finally, vocational training is the best choice for intermediate
values of β and youths with a preference for professional jobs.
How do choices vary with changes in Δvwcol and Δuwv equivalent to those
observed in Spain since 1995?
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• An increase in wuwv leads some vocational training students to drop out.
In Figure A.2., the increase in unskilled wages expands the set of β and
S
wv
that find it optimal to leave vocational training. In addition, students
of the academic track with low levels of patience (β) and a low taste for
professional jobs (low level of Swv ) also choose to drop out.
• Holding wuwv constant, a drop inΔvwcol alters the choice between vocational
and academic training only. Under the assumptions of Figure A.3., the
fraction of individuals that drop out is unaffected
3.1 Identification
The data we use is the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA, by its Spanish initials),
similar to the Current Population Survey in the U.S.. We observe only the final
educational attainment at the age of 25. As for wvwu and
wcol
wv
, we assume that
young adults form their expectations based on the observed wages of different
skill groups in the relevant local labor market. Below, we argue that the relevant
local labor market in our application is the province: that is level that most
wages are bargained in collective agreements. Hence, we estimate reduced-form
versions of the choice
Si,p,t = α0 + α1
wu
wv
+ α2
wv
wcol
+ μp + θt + εi,p,t
Si,p,t is the educational attainment reported by the individual at the age of
25. μp are local labor market fixed effects, θt are time fixed effects and
wu
wv
and
wv
wcol
denote the wage structure that youths would observe at the age of 17 -when
educational decisions are taken.3
The relevant measure of wvwu and
wcol
wv
is not obvious. One option is directly
elicit wage expectations by young adults (Beffy et al, 2009, Manski, 2004). An
alternative option is to use contemporaneous average wages by skill level in
the relevant local labor market: Manski 1993, López-Mayán, 2010. Buchinsky
and Leslie (2010) suggest a more sophisticated approach in which youth adults
base their schooling decisions on the structure of current and past wages and
update their beliefs about the future using a VAR of the different centiles of
the distribution. Those strategies assume that youths take the wage of con-
temporaneous adults as indications of the wage the young adult will have when
older if that level of skill is chosen. A problem with the strategy of focussing
on current wages is that contemporaneous wages are likely to be determined
by the relative scarcity of unskilled labor. Studies of the wage structure by
Card and Lemieux (2001) or Carneiro and Lee (2011) illustrate hat the relative
supply of workers with different skill levels determines versions of the ratios wuwv
and wvwcol . Secondly, it is not obvious what wages young adults actually observe
3 In principle, it is not obvious that the ratios of wages in different skill levels are the best
choice to measure the incentive to study -rather than, for example, the level of the wage.
Nevertheless, as we use variation across provinces over time, by taking ratios of wages we
mitigate problems related to inter-provincial differences in the cost of living (see Moretti,
2010).
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when taking their decisions about human capital investment. An ideal measure
of incentives should be (a) observable by the youth and (b) unresponsive to
relative changes in the relative supply of unskilled workers. Our proposal is
to exploit the prevalence of binding collective agreements at the province level
in the Spanish economy. We see two main advantages in these measure. The
first is that collective agreements set skill-specific wages that are legally binding
during a pre-specified period of time - the typical period ranges between 1 and
3 years in your sample. By definition, during the life of the agreement those
wages are downwardly rigid, thus will not respond to changes in the relative sup-
ply of workers. Secondly, we document below that the wages of the unskilled
youths present substantial bunching of wages around the collectively contracted
wages. Hence, agreed wages are effective and likely to be observed by a youth
considering leaving the educational system .
Of course, in the moment they are initially signed wages in collective bar-
gaining are not randomly assigned and respond to the expectations of the local
labor market of unions and employers. We use several strategies to control for
such effects. Firstly, we include controls for the contemporaneous unemploy-
ment rate of the youth by skill level. Secondly, we also experiment including
additional controls for province-level trends. To the extent that the influx of
new entrants is partly determined by the evolution of demography (larger co-
horts at the province level), provincial time trends would net out such effects.
Si,p,t = β0 + β1
wu
wv
+ β2
wv
wcol
+ μp + μp ∗ t+ θt + εi,p,t
As mentioned above, we define three levels of schooling attainment by a
young adult i in a province p at time t: basic schooling (or less), vocational
training, or a joint outcome that lumps together secondary academic track and
college. The vocational and the academic track provide a very different set of
skills to youth that complete them. As we found it very hard to rank those skills,
we estimate the model as a multinomial logit. In addition, in most specifications
we also show the results with a binary dependent variable that takes value 1 if the
youth completed any degree beyond the compulsory one. Familial characteristics
exhibited a steady improvement over the sample period. To control for those,
some specifications we select a sample of coresident young adults (86% of our
sample live with their parents at the age of 25). Namely, we control for dummies
with the educational attainment of the mother and indicators of whether the
mother and the father are present.
The coefficients of interest are those of the two measures of the returns to
skill β1and β2. The identification is obtained from changes across provinces and
time in the ratios of unskilled to skilled wages when a cohort reaches the age of
17.
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4 The data.
4.1 Main dataset
We use the 1992-2009 waves of the Spanish Labor Force Survey “Encuesta de
Población Activa”, the Spanish equivalent to the Current Population Survey
in the U.S. The survey we use is a repeated cross-section representative of the
Spanish population, interviewing some 20,000 households every quarter. It pro-
vides detailed information on the educational attainment and the labor mar-
ket and demographic outcomes of individuals above 16 years old. In the case
of young adults residing with their parents, the survey allows reconstructing
parental characteristics. While the public-release version of the survey typically
codes the age of individuals in five-year bands, the Spanish Statistical Institute
provided us with the age in years. The Spanish Labor Force Survey does not
contain wages in the sample period we examine. As for province, we use that
of current residence.4
4.2 Information on wages
We rely on out-of-sample information to construct two measures of the wages
that a young adult would use to form expectations about earnings in different
education paths.
Measuring the expected return to skill at age 17 using actual wages
We use administrative records of earnings as drawn from Social Security
records Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales: Wave 2007. This dataset con-
tains a random sample of 4% of individuals who were affiliated to the Social
Security system in 2007 (either as employees or as unemployed). The sample
contains the monthly earnings of all labor relationships since the moment when
the person joined the Social Security system. While the register contains high
quality information on wages, it lacks reliable information about the educa-
tion level of young workers.5 Despite the lack of information about educational
level, we construct proxies of wages by skill level using the fact that workers are
grouped into 11 categories for Social Security purposes. The grouping consists
on a partition that is a mix of occupation and skill (see Table A.2.) The top
two groups explicitly correspond to individuals with some form of college degree.
4 In some specifications, we use information about the enrolment status of the individual.
The information about schooling attainment and enrolment is obtained from each individual
16 or above and asks about whether children over 16 were in school during the last four
weeks. We dropped the third quarter, that spans the summer. Prior to 2005 there was only
one question on attendance, but after that date there was a separation between regular and
non-regular courses. The mere fact of separating the pre-2005 question into two seems to
have led additional respondents to report they were attending school. Since before 2000, the
distinction between regular and non-regular courses was not available, so we are forced to
consider non-regular students post 2005 as enrolled in the educational system. However, the
break in the series due to the change in the questionnaire is not evident below the age of 20.
5There is a mesure of schooling in the Registry that was obtained by linking the Social
Security Registers with information with Census data. The quality of the information on
education is not very reliable for young individuals.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1208
The rest of groups are numbered according to a decreasing level of qualification,
with the bottom two groups representing “laborers” - positions for which no
degree is required. Admittedly, there are cases of individuals with a college de-
gree whose employer pays wages according to contribution groups other than the
first two. Nevertheless a study of the evolution of the wage structure in Spain in
Felgueroso et al (2010) documents that returns to skill using contribution groups
or education level give a very similar picture. Hence, in what follows we rely
on the classification for Social Security purposes. It is worth noting that such
classification is not merely administrative: collective agreements specify wages
for each of those groups separately, and those increase monotonically with the
skill level.
There are two additional concerns with our measure of earnings. The first is
that monthly earnings are capped at the maximum wage that the Social Security
uses to compute contributions to old age and health pensions. The second in the
presence of selective attrition from the labor force, the sampling method does
not guarantee that the wage that a worker in 2006 perceived ten years before is
representative of the past distribution of earnings. To overcome the problem of
censoring in earnings, our analysis focuses on median wages. Censoring affects
very little the median of young worker’s wages, that are very concentrated and
typically far away from the cap. The issue becomes more problematic for our
measures of other age groups, so we limit ourselves to groups up to 45 years of
age. Second, regarding the representativeness of the sample, we use only males’
earnings.
We construct a measure of the expected wage profile over a lifetime if the
worker obtains tertiary education (first two contribution groups) intermediate
education (groups 3-9) or no education at all (group 10 or laborers) assuming a
zero interest rate. The exact measure of wages for the unskilled is the following
Ws,p,t =
g=3∑
g=1
.33 ∗Med[W (s)g,p,t,] (1)
Where g is an index for age group (we use three groups: 16-25, 26-35, and
36-45), p is an index of the 50 provinces, t refers at the year of measurement
and s is the skill level. W (s = 10) is the wage of workers classified as laborers,
that we use to define unskilled workers. We construct similar measures for mid-
skill workers (same age groups, but using W (s = 3..9) skill groups 3-9) and for
high-skill workers W (s = 1..2) -see Table A.2.
Measures based on Bargained Wages in Collective Agreements
An alternative measure of wages is obtained from the Registry of Collective
Agreements between 1990-2009. Collective contracts in Spain are automatically
extended to all employers and employees under the scope of the agreement and
the clauses included are legally binding. As a matter of fact, they have the same
publicity as an Act from the Parliament and it is compulsory for the unions and
employers signing them to register their terms and conditions at the Ministry
of Labor. The information in the register contains, among other variables, its
industrial and geographical coverage, the wage growth agreed in the contract
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as well as the month and year when the contract was signed and the period
during which it is binding. We selected those agreements whose coverage was
at the province-industry level. Between 1993 and 2001 the registry contains
information about the wage levels for each of the skill groups in Table A.2, and
that is the information we use to construct our preferred measure of earnings.
The concept we use is the “base wage”, that excludes any premia linked to
tenure on the job, age or performance. The concept is closely linked to entry
wages. We were unable to construct the wage measure for all provinces as not
all collective agreements register the levels of agreed wages. Hence, out of the
50 provinces, we only use 35.
We construct proxies of the wages of workers with college education using
the “base wages” of the first and second contribution groups. We proxy the
wages of unskilled workers using the base wage of laborers (group 10 in Table
A.2.). For the group with intermediate education, we use the wage of group 3
(administrative workers).6 The measure of skill-specific wages we use is
W s,p,t =
j=6∑
j=1
πs,j,p,1995ws,j,p,t (2)
Where j indexes industries, p indexes the province and t indexes time. ws,j,p,t
is the wage bargained in industry j for province p and period t for skill group s.
We use information on 6 industries. The first five are construction, retail, metal,
hostels and restaurants and services to the industry. We aggregate the wages of
the rest of the industries into a 6th group. πs,j,p,1995 is the employment share of
the industry in a province - education group as of 1995.7 The temporal variation
of industry share of employment is likely to be determined by the relative supply
and demand of unskilled workers, and may thus reflect factors other than the
opportunity cost of studying. Hence, we fix the province-specific weight at the
beginning of our sample, in 1995. The computation of province-skill specific
weight of the industry for young adults are computed using the Labor Force
Survey. As in the previous case, we construct measures of unskilled wages, mid-
skill wages (group 3 in Table A.2.) and top skill wages (groups 1 and 2 in Table
A.2.).8
The choice of industries is based on the pattern of specialization of skilled
and unskilled young adults. Workers below 40 years of age and with basic edu-
6Most values between groups 4-9 are missing in the collective agreements database and that
is the reason why group 3 is the only one used. In any case, group 3 is the most important
quantitatively in terms of workers.
7The skill groups used to compute the incidence of the industry in the province are defined
in terms of schooling. We define three groups: compulsory or less, vocational training and
upper secondary schooling and college.
8Wage changes can be decomposed into two components (see Gould et al., 2002) The first
one measures wage growth within the industry holding the initial share of employment in the
industry constant. The second component reflects compositional effects due to the increasing
weight of certain industries. Our measure of the returns to skill uses only the first component,
as part of the increase in the employment in the construction sector may be associated to the
fact that the youth that abandoned the schooling system work in industries that are intensive
in unskilled workers.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1208
cation -or less- work mainly in construction (20% in 1995), retail (7% in 1995)
and agriculture (10%). On the other hand, males with at least upper secondary
schooling work in services to industry and the education and health sector (23%
in 1995). While workers with upper secondary schooling or higher also work in
construction, they do so to a lesser extent than unskilled young adults (10% in
1995, and the fraction did change much after that year). Between 1997 and 2009,
the concentration of unskilled youth working in construction increased substan-
tially: see Figure A.4. The second reason to focus on industries to construct
wage levels is that wages increased differently across industries. Between 1993
and 2001 unions and firm representatives in the construction sector bargained
yearly wage increases between 50 and 75 basis points larger than in the rest of
the industries. Figure 5 compares the evolution of the year-on-year growth of
wages in collective bargaining agreements in construction and the rest of indus-
tries. Bargained wages in construction have been consistently higher than the
rest of industries since 1998. Hence, the returns to any form of skill are most
likely to fall in provinces where young adults were, as of 1995, specially likely
to work in construction.
4.3 Do collective agreement wages reflect the economic
opportunities of young adults?
We present three pieces of evidence suggesting that the relative variation in
wages bargained in collective agreements does reflect the opportunity cost of
studying. Firstly, we document that the wages settled for unskilled workers
actually bind, as there is substantial concentration of actual wages of young
workers around the levels bargained in collective agreements (at least for con-
struction). Secondly, the variation over time of bargained wages responds to
the labor market tightness of workers after 40 years of age, not that of young
adults. Finally, we show that changes in bargained and actual wages are linked.
Accumulation of wages at the level settled by collective agreements : Figure
3 shows the histogram of wages of unskilled young workers in a large Spanish
province: Barcelona. Those are monthly wages from Social Security records,
and correspond to all male adults with at least one year of experience, between
18 and 35 years of age and who has the lowest level of skill according to Social
Security definitions. The histogram also displays two lines: the wage in the col-
lective agreement for retail and for construction. Figure 4 displays substantial
accumulation of monthly earnings around the bargained wage in construction.
Note that the degree of bunching is apparent without conditioning on the indus-
try where the young adult works. Hence, the degree of bunching in Figure 3 also
reflects that construction is a prevalent option among unskilled workers. Fig-
ure 4 shows the same histogram for 2000 —same province, age and contribution
group. The accumulation at the collectively bargained wage in construction for
that year is equally prominent. Hence, both from a legal and an economic point
of view, the wage level settled in the construction collective agreement acts as
an industry-province specific minimum wage.
Some determinants of wage growth in collective agreements
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The identification strategy in our study relies in the time-series variation
in industry-specific minimum wages within provinces. A key assumption is
that province-specific changes in bargained wages do not respond to province-
specific shifts in the supply of unskilled young adults. Models of wage bargaining
typically assume that final wages depend on the outside opportunities of firms
and workers, and stress the role of unemployment as an (inverse) measure of
outside opportunities. Hence, to understand whose outside opportunities are
taking into account in wage bargaining, we regressed wage growth on (one-year
lagged) unemployment rates of unskilled workers in four age groups: 16-25,
26-35, 36-45 and 46-55. The regression also includes province-level and year
dummies. The former control for provincial long-run specialization, and the
latter for macro factors that affect wage growth (such as the inflation rate). We
lag the unemployment rate to mitigate simultaneity biases.
Table A.3 presents the results for 4 different agreements: construction, retail,
metal and a composite of the rest of the agreements. All regressions are weighted
by the number of workers covered by the agreement. The result is column 1
row 1 is -239. That is, a 10% increase of the provincial unemployment rate of
workers between 16 and 25 years of age reduces wage growth in construction by
.239 percentage points (standard error: .18). The estimate in row 4 column 1,
measuring wage responses to unemployment among the 46-55 year old is -755.
That is, increases in unemployment rate among individuals between 46 and 55
years have three times the impact on wage growth than that of 16-25 years of
age. The estimates vary a bit across industries but generally suggest a much
larger wage growth response to the unemployment rate of workers over 35 than
to the unemployment rate of unskilled young workers. We infer from the pattern
of estimates that bargained wage growth do not react to the economic condition
of unskilled young workers.
Bargained and actual wages The third piece of evidence shows the link be-
tween wages in collective agreements and the measures of wages used in the
previous section —the median of actual wages perceived by unskilled workers
relative to the median of actual wages perceived by mid- and high-skilled work-
ers.
Table 3, row 1 shows weighted-least squares estimates of the impact of the
ratio of the wages of laborers on mid-skill groups on the wage bargained for
laborers in the province for the five industries considered: construction, metal,
services, retail and rest. Each province-year unit provides one observation, and
the coefficients are estimated using Weighted Least Squares, where the weights
are the number of workers in the province in the Social Security database (as
that was the database used to compute median wages). One thousand euros
extra in the collective agreement wage in construction increases the ratio of
unskilled to mid-skill wages by 1.9 percent (standard error: .6). We also obtain
a significant coefficient for the retail industry (albeit much smaller in magnitude)
and for the rest of industries. Overall, the ratio of skill specific wages defined
as in (2) is a significant determinant of the ratio of low-to mid- skill wages. We
obtain a worse fit for skilled wages. Such result is well known in the literature:
collectively bargained wages matter more in the lower and in the higher part of
the distribution of wages.
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5 Results using median wages in province-skill-
age cells
Table 4 presents estimates of the impact on final schooling attainment (measured
at age 25) of two measures of the skill premium when a young adult was 17. The
measures utilized are the return to some form of high school education —either
vocational training or high school- measured as the provincial ratio of wages in
unskilled jobs over wages in mid-skill ones: WunskilledWmid_skill . The second measure is
the (inverse of the) returns to college —measured as the provincial ratio of wages
in jobs that require a college degree and wages in jobs that require some training:
Wmid_skill
Wcollege . The estimates shown are the marginal effects of the variable in each
row on the probability of observing the educational outcome in each column.9
All specifications include province and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
all clustered at the province level.
We start by showing marginal effects measuring the impact of each wage
ratio on the overall probability of completing some form of post-compulsory
schooling. The response of post-compulsory education to a 10% increase in
Wunskilled
Wmid_skill is shown in Table 4, Panel A, row 1, and is -.018 (standard error:
.08). A cohort that observes at age 17 a ratio of the wages of laborers relative to
mid-skill jobs 10% higher than the province average is 1.8 percentage points less
likely to complete basic school. Columns 2-4 in Table 4 explore how such change
changes the educational composition of the cohort. The coefficient of vocational
training is -.016 (standard error: .009), while that of the academic high school
track is .006 (standard error: .014). The pattern of results suggests that relative
increases in the wages of unskilled workers increase the pool of workers without
any level of skill at the expense of students with vocational training.
The second row of Table 4 documents how increases in the upper part of
the wage structure affect the composition of educational attainment. Firstly, a
10% increase in the ratio Wmid_skillWcollege observed at age 17 does not affect much
the fraction of male youths achieving post-secondary education. The marginal
estimate in Table 4, Panel A, column 1, row 2 is -.002, not significantly different
from zero. Still, within the group of individuals that achieve more than basic
education, a 10% increase in Wmid_skillWcollege over the provincial average increases
the share of male youths completing vocational training by .7 percentage points
at the expense of the academic high school track, that falls by 1.1 percentage
points. The estimates are not very precise, though.
Unemployment in the province at age 17 plays a small role in the educational
decisions of young males. A cohort that observed a one percent increase in the
ratio of the unemployment rate of unskilled workers relative to that of skilled
workers at the age of 17 seems to be .2 pp percent more likely to finish basic
9The estimates are evaluated for a young adult living in Madrid at 25 years of age and
born in 1974.
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schooling, contrary to the idea that unemployment leads young adults to stay
at school. However, as it will be clearer later, once we control for time and
province dummies the effect is not signifficantly different than zero. Therefore,
conditional on the wage the young adult obtains if working, the rate of arrival
of new offers does not seem to be an important determinant of schooling attain-
ment. Clark (forthcoming) using UK data and Petrongolo and San Segundo
(2002), with Spanish data, document that regional unemployment diminishes
the chances of school enrolment between 16 and 18. Nevertheless, those studies
do not control for relative wages. We also note that those studies focus on en-
rolment at age 16 or 17, a different outcome than schooling attainment at age
25 if young adults re-enter the educational system at some point. We study the
enrolment responses to wages below.
Table 4, Panel B shows the coefficients when we select to the sample of
workers who live with their parents at their age of 25 —85% of the sample. The
advantage of that sample is that we can control for the educational level of the
parents of the youth. The coefficients become more precise: a 10 percentage
points increase in ratio of wages in low-skill positions relative to mid-skill po-
sitions observed at age 17 leads to an increase of 1.8 percentage points in the
fraction of young adults who only complete basic schooling (standard error: 1.1)
and a drop of 2.3 percentage points in the fraction of young adults completing
vocational training. The pool of students with academic high school at 25 is
not affected much, a finding consistent with cross-sectional evidence using a
structural model by Lopez-Mayan (2010).
Table 4 Panel C shows the results of the specification (2) when one adds
province-level trends. Such trends absorb any province-specific development
in educational attainment - like if the reform of the educational system was
province-specific — or wages —like trends in population growth that affect relative
wages. Such specification is very demanding, as coefficients are now identified
out of variation in changes in the skill-wage profile that depart from a province
level trend. The estimates of the response of educational attainment to increases
in the relative wages of unskilled workers are very similar to those in Table 4
Panel B, suggesting that omitted biases related both to wages and schooling
attainment at the province level are not driving our results.
Finally, we test the suitability of the cohort-level specification by regressing
the schooling attainment of a cohort on the wages that such cohort observed
at the age 22 —once schooling decisions are basically taken. The coefficients are
either statistically insignificant and lower in magnitude than those in Table 4.B.
The results suggests that median wages in the province-skill-age cell at age 17
are not driven by spurious trends at the province level and that the timing of
changes in relative wages matters for educational attainment.
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6 The response of schooling attainment to wage
structure: using wages in collective agreements
Next, we examine the schooling responses to changes in relative wages of un-
skilled and mid-skilled workers when the latter are measured using wages estab-
lished in collective agreements. As we mention above, this measure is arguably
better than using median wages in province-skill-age cells, as it is less affected
by relative changes in the supply of unskilled workers.
6.1 The Response of Males.
Table 5A shows the response of schooling attainment at age 25 to a 10% increase
in the ratio of bargained wages in low-skill jobs relative to mid-skill (row 1) and
the ratio of mid- to high-skill jobs (row 2), both observed at age 17. As in
Table 4, the first magnitude measures are the (inverse of the) returns to acquire
at least some schooling. The second is the (inverse of the) returns to college:
the ratio between mid-skill wages and the bargained wages of jobs that require
college. As before, all responses are evaluated for a young adult born in 1974,
living in Madrid and, in Panels B-D, living with parents and whose mother has
high school.
Column 1 of Table 5A Panel A shows the response of the probability of com-
pleting any form of secondary schooling on both measures of the wage structure,
estimated using a Probit. Cohorts that observed a ratio of unskilled to mid skill
wages 10 percentage points above the provincial mean were 6.5 percentage points
less likely to having completed schooling beyond the compulsory at the age of
25. The standard error is 1.8 percentage points. Instead, the ratio of mid-skill
to top skilled wages at the age 17 does not help predicting secondary schooling
completion. The estimates are substantially larger than comparable ones pre-
sented in Table 4. Even though the sample is different -as for some provinces,
we had no information about collective agreements, the large magnitude of the
estimates suggests attenuation bias due to the simultaneity of demand for and
supply of unskilled work. In Columns 2-4 we show how the different forms of
schooling attainment are affected by changes in the wage structure, now using a
multinomial logit. The coefficient of the first row of Table 5, Panel A, column 2
is .055 (standard error: .015). That is, a cohort exposed at age of 17 to a ratio
of unskilled-to mid skill wages 10% higher than the provincial average is 5.5
percentage points more likely to attain only basic schooling and 6.5 percentage
points less likely to finish high school than a cohort who faced at age 17 the
average ratios in the province. Aside from the larger magnitude, the key differ-
ence with respect to the results in Table 4 is that we now find mainly a response
among students of the academic high track. López-Mayán (2010) successfully
estimates a structural model of grade progression for the 1985 cohort, finding
that students of vocational training are most sensitive to relative changes in
the return to vocational training, measured in a way that is similar to our first
measure. While our estimates in Table 4 resemble those of López-Mayán, once
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we use a measure of relative wages that is less sensitive to relative changes in
the supply of unskilled workers, the high wage sensitivity of vocational training
students disappears. In principle, the simple model in Model 2 is ambiguous
about what group should respond most.
The impact on schooling attainment of our measure of the returns to college
is shown in the second row of Table 5A. A cohort who was exposed at 17 to a
ratio of mid-skill wages to college wages 10% higher than the provincial average
is 3.8 percentage points less likely to complete high school (standard error: 1.5
pp) and 3.6 percentage points more likely to finish vocational training. The
result suggests again that young adults engage in upper secondary schooling as
a route to complete college. Holding constant the ratio of unskilled wages to
mid- skill ones, a drop in college returns does not affect the chances of completing
primary schooling. That pattern of results also departs from what we found in
Table 4, where the fraction of youth with basic schooling increased when the
return to college dropped while that with vocational training was affected little.
Panels B and C in Table 5 examine the robustness of the results in Panel
A when we limit the sample to coresidents (and are thus able to control for
parental background characteristics) or add province-specific trends. The main
result that an increase in the relative wage of unskilled workers leads to affected
cohorts to complete at most the compulsory schooling level at the expense of
potential students of the high school academic track is robust to those changes
in the specification. The most noticeable change is that, when we add provincial
trends, we no longer find statistically significant impact of the returns to college
on the share of young adults completing either upper secondary or vocational
training. A possible reason for that is that, unlike the return to acquiring some
education, returns to college fell uniformly during the sample period —see Figure
2. It may be hard to empirically distinguish between a provincial trend and a
decreasing return to college.
6.1.1 Unemployment -adjusted wages
The returns to education are not only observed in higher wages, but also in a
lower probability of losing the job —see De la Fuente and Jimeno (2009). There
is a strong relationship between the educational level and the probability of
being unemployed. Hence, we adjust the measure of wages (3) as follows
Ŵs,p,t =
j=6∑
j=1
πs,j,p,1995ws,j,p,t[1− P (US,j,p,t)]
That is, we weight the average wage of unskilled workers in collective agree-
ments by the province-specific probability of being unemployed among workers
with basic education level and ages between 26 and 35 when the cohort was
17. The measure assumes that income is zero when a young adult that does
not work —ie, we ignore unemployment benefits. We adjust the returns of mid-
skill (high-skill) workers by multiplying by 1 minus the probability of being
unemployed by workers with vocational training or only with upper secondary
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school (college). The probability of being unemployed is computed only among
active workers, and ignores nonparticipation. The results of the new measure
are shown in Table 5B. In that specification, we also control for the ratio of
unemployment rate between the unskilled and the mid-skilled workers as well
as for the ratio of unemployment between the mid-skilled and the high skilled.
The results are similar to those in Table 5A and we do not comment them in
detail.
6.1.2 Responses by parental background
Next, we examine what groups are most responsive to changes in the wage
structure observed at 17. The discussion in Section 2 leads us to expect that
less patient youths -or those with a higher marginal propensity for present
consumption- are specially sensitive to increases in Wunskilled
Wmid_skill
. We do not have
information about both parental income and education, to decisively disentan-
gle between parental education and parental income effects. Still, we control for
parental education. We re-estimate the multinomial logit for each subsample of
coresident youths separately.
When we compare the response of educational attainment in rows 1 and 3
of Table 5B we find much larger point estimates of Wunskilled
Wmid_skill
in the subsample
of males with low-education mothers than in the subsample of mothers with
high education or higher. As in Table 5A, once we condition on province-
specific trends, we fail to detect a statistically or economically relevant response
of educational attainment of changes in Wmid_skillW col lege in any of the partitions
considered.
6.2 The Response of the schooling attainment of females
The educational attainment of females also stagnated among Spanish nationals,
but to a lesser extent than for males. The share of female Spanish citizens that
by the age of 25 had achieved compulsory schooling or less dropped from 50%
(1967 cohort) to 26% (1979 cohort) to subsequently increase to 30% among the
1984 cohort. Aparicio (2010) documents that unskilled Spanish females do not
work in the construction sector. Yet, wage growth in the sectors where unskilled
females typically work (retail and restaurants+hotels) was also higher than that
in skill-intensive industries. Hence, it can be argued that females’ incentive to
acquire higher education also fell during the sample period.
Table 6 redoes the whole exercise for females but modifying the measure of
wages (2) to take into account that πs,j,p,1995 are female specific. Panel A of
Table 6 suggests that the increase in unskilled wages, relative to mid-skill ones
has little explanatory power for schooling attainment at the age of 25 whatever
the sample considered.
Unlike in the case for males, there is some evidence of a response of schooling
attainment to increases in the relative wage of wages in high-skilled jobs. When
we control for parental background, a 10% increase in the ratio of the wages in
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high-skill jobs relative to mid-skill ones decreases the share of females complet-
ing vocational training by 0.99 percentage points (Panel B, row 4, column 2)
increasing the fraction completing upper secondary or more by .96 pp (Panel B,
row 4, column 3). Interestingly, the negative response of vocational training to
increases in high-skilled wages is robust to the inclusion of province level trends.
Still, some of the estimates are imprecise.
6.3 Quantification of the impact for males.
Table 7 provides an alternative quantification of the impact of the responses
in the fourth panel of Table 5, conducting the following counterfactual: What
would have been the evolution of schooling attainment of the 1984 cohort had it
faced at age 17 the wage structure of the 1978 cohort? We perform the compu-
tation using the properties of multinomial logit specification. In particular, we
first predict for each individual his educational attainment at age 25 based on
the wage structure observed at 17. The special assumptions of the multinomial
logit guarantee that the predicted share for each cohort coincide with actual
values. We then predict the educational attainment when, holding constant
the rest of the covariates, we change the wages structure with that of the same
province, but observed by the 1984 cohort.
The results in the first panel of Table 7 suggest that the observed changes
in the wage structure have contributed substantially to the changes in educa-
tional attainment. For example, within the cohort of males born in 1984, 36%
completed at most basic schooling. The fraction was 33.2% among the 1976
cohort. According to our estimates, had the 1984 cohort observed the returns
of the 1978 one, the corresponding share of youths with basic schooling would
have been 34.2%. That is, changes in the wage structure would explain 1.8% of
the 2.4% observed increase. The model does worse when fitting the evolution
of the share of youths with vocational training and the academic high school
track.
In the second Panel of Table 7, we present additional estimates that control
for covariates -the education of the mother and household structure at 25- to
take into account that the educational attainment of parents has been increasing
during the sample period. The results are similar to those in Panel A and we
do not comment them in detail.
6.4 The response of school enrolment to changes in wage
structure.
We provide evidence on the dynamics of the response of human capital invest-
ment to changes in the structure of wages at ages 16-18. The aim of the exercise
is to check whether a higher ratio of the wage of unskilled workers relative to
wages in mid-skill jobs leads the youth to leave the school (in the spirit of the
exercises by Sanders et al, 2005). As in Tables 5 and 6, we use measures that
rely on wages signed in collective agreements.
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The OLS coefficient in row 1, column 1 in Table 8 indicates that a cohort
that observes a 10% increase in the ratio of the wages of laborers and the
wages of mid-skill workers is .7 percentage points more likely to abandon the
schooling system between the ages of 16 and 18 than a cohort that observes
the province-specific mean ratio of unskilled to mid-skill workers. The standard
error, corrected for arbitrary correlation across observations in the same province
is .39. The response of enrolment to a 10% increase in the wage of unskilled
workers is slightly lower when we examine at the sample of coresidents: .6
percentage points. Probit estimates are qualitatively similar but smaller and less
precise —and not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent
confidence level.
Overall, the estimates of enrolment are broadly in line with the evidence from
the educational attainment specifications, and suggest that one of the channels
by which young adults end up achieving a lower level of attainment is through
leaving school at early ages.
7 Implications and conclusion.
Between 1986 and 2009 Spain experienced a drop and a subsequent increase
in the wage of unskilled young workers relative to mid-skill ones. That ratio
diminished during the 1992 crisis - that expelled some 8% of the workforce
from the labor market- but increased steadily during the subsequent expansion,
that involved a large increase of the unskilled-intensive construction sector. At
the same time, the schooling attainment of Spanish cohorts experienced im-
provement until that born in 1976 and deteriorated afterwards. We combine
administrative records on earnings, information on industry-province collective
agreements and information on educational attainment in an employment sur-
vey to estimate the response of schooling attainment to changes in the return
to skill that adults may observe at the age of 17. Unlike previous work, we
examine the response of final schooling attainment to changes in the return to
skill. Hence, our estimates can inform about how perceived returns may affect
the final set of skills acquired in the formal education system (academic skills
in upper vocational branch and professional skills acquired in the vocational
branch). We use the wage structure in collective agreements to obtain variation
in wages that unskilled workers effectively get and that are not affected by the
contemporaneous changes in the supply of labor.
Our preferred estimates suggest that changes in the wage structure have
effects on the composition of skills that males acquire in the formal education
system. In particular, the increase in the unskilled to mid-skill wages ratio ob-
served between the years 1993 and 2001 led to a 1.8 percentage points increase
in the fraction of youth who completed primary education (or less), mainly at
the expense of the proportion of youth completing upper high school. The find-
ing is robust to adjustments for differential incidence of unemployment across
education groups and suggests that the investment in academic skills is more
elastic to unskilled wages that investments in skills directly related to profes-
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sional activities. We find weak schooling responses to perceived wage increases
in high-skill jobs. As for females, we find a weak response of the probability of
investing in academic skills in response to relative increase in high skill wages,
but no response whatsoever to increases in wages in low-skilled jobs.
These estimates have implications on the future productivity of those cohorts
— wages of workers in their twenties with basic schooling were 6 and 9 percent
lower than those with vocational training and 3 percent lower than those with
upper secondary schooling only according to the 2006 Spanish Survey on the
Structure of Wages. A quantification of the amount of the associated losses is
left for future research.
8 Appendix 1: Correspondence between school-
ing levels, both systems
This appendix describes our assumptions to make a correspondence between
systems. To provide some intuition, Table A.1 shows the educational system
before and after 1990.
Basic schooling: Equivalent to 8th grade of primary schooling (or less) under
the old system and second cycle (or less) under the new one.
Upper secondary schooling: Equivalent to finishing pre-University (and high
school) under the old system, and the second cycle of upper secondary schooling
under the new one.
Vocational training: Completing any of the grades under both systems. Ide-
ally, we would like to distinguish between grades within each systems and, even
better, across systems. Unfortunately, the coding in the Spanish Employment
Survey does not allow a clear correspondence between the old and the new
system. We lumped together all vocational training together, and note that
students finishing the degree under the new system may be better qualified
than those under the old system if the first grade of Vocational Training was
prevalent under the old system.
College: Any college under any of both systems.
9 Appendix 2: Explanation of Figures A.1. and
A.2.
A young adult will choose vocational training over academic training if the
relative gains of waiting one more year to reap the returns (weighted by the
chances of success at college) exceed the cost of weighting (measured at the
market price R) by an amount sufficient to exceed the idiosyncratic taste for
occupational jobs.
S
wv
= p[
βΔvwcol −R
R
] (VT -A)
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where Δvwcol = wcol−wvwv The individual will choose the vocational track
over no schooling if the preference for professional tasks plus the extra return
on vocational activities during the 2 final periods exceeds the benefit of already
consuming in the first period.
β
R
[
S
wv
+Δuwv(1 +
β
R
)] =
wu
wv
(VT - DO)
where Δuwv = wv−wuwu . Finally, the indifference condition between the aca-
demic training and unskilled work is determined by:
[
β
R
+
β
R
]Δuwv + p[
βΔuwcol − 1−R
R
] = 1 (A-DO)
where Δuwcol = wcol−wuwu .
Obviously, a set of individuals will always choose no training if the discount
factor is sufficiently low ( β close enough to zero). Imagine that there is a set of
prices in the market R, wvwu and
wcol
wv
. Individuals will select in any of the three
choices according to their values of β, p and S.
Figure A.1. displays the equilibrium choices in the β, S space assuming
R = 1. For a level of β = 1, no one will be a high school dropout under
our assumptions of existence of market returns to any form of schooling. For
that level of patience, only individuals with relatively a level of Swv such that,
S
wv
> p[Δvwcol − 1] will choose the vocational training. Now, S = 0 at a
minimum. Hence, the minimum level of β for which there are indifferent youths
between the academic and the vocational track is.
β =
1
Δvwcol
Hence, in the { Swv , β} space, a straight line with slope pΔvwcol from [0, 1Δvwcol ]
to [1,Δvwcol− 1] defines the indifference levels between vocational training and
the academic track. Points above that curve (see Figure A.1.) contain the set
of values { Swv , β} for which vocational training is the best option.
Regarding points for β < 1Δvwcol , the only relevant condition is whether
enrol in vocational training or to leave the schooling system altogether. The
indifference curve between both options is given by condition VT-DO, that
yields the following curve
S
wv
=
1
β
wu
wv
−Δuwv(1 + β)
That is a decreasing function, that tends to infinity at β = 0 -no level of
idiosyncratic utility can induce a person who only cares about today to incur in
any investment. The curve must cross the axis of β at a value below β < 1 (as
when β = 1 being a school dropout can never be optimal given our assumptions).
We draw Figure A.1. under the assumption that the level of β that makes Swv
equal zero exceeds 1Δvwcol .
Hence, Figure A.1. allows us to examine what happens when wuwv increases.
In that case, the indifference curve between vocational training and being a drop
out moves to the right, inducing to be a drop—out both impatient vocational
training and academic track students with a low level of Swv .
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Table 1: Evolution of schooling attainment of male natives at age 25 
Year of birth Primary Vocational training Upper secondary College
1971 47.6 20.82 15.17 16.41
1972 45.52 20.54 15.25 18.7
1973 45.46 20.7 15.63 18.22
1974 42.53 21.9 15.09 20.48
1975 38.63 21.74 18,00 21.63
1976 38.28 23.31 16.51 21.89
1977 36.25 23.42 19.3 21.03
1978 37.23 20.85 17.91 24.01
1979 38.66 21.29 17.53 22.52
1980 37.83 24,00 18.02 20.16
1981 37.78 25.4 16.91 19.91
1982 38.35 24.74 17.78 19.12
1983 37.63 25.57 15.45 21.34
1984 40.02 25.00 15.13 19.85
Source: EPA, 1992-2009 waves (excluding third quarter). Sample of males age 25
each year. Primary school includes individuals who dropped before finishing 
compulsory education. For definitions of upper secondary and vocational training, see Table A.1.
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Table 2: The evolution of the ratio of skilled-to unskilled wages observed at age 17
Calendar year Cohort turning 17 Wun(16-45)/Wmed(25-45) Wmed(16-45)/Wsk(25-45)
1986 1969 0.766 0.645
1987 1970 0.763 0.642
1988 1971 0.758 0.632
1989 1972 0.746 0.605
1990 1973 0.749 0.591
1991 1974 0.746 0.590
1992 1975 0.752 0.579
1993 1976 0.725 0.590
1994 1977 0.710 0.577
1995 1978 0.697 0.569
1996 1979 0.693 0.562
1997 1980 0.702 0.567
1998 1981 0.712 0.563
1999 1982 0.726 0.560
2000 1983 0.739 0.562
2001 1984 0.743 0.563
2002 1985 0.742 0.564
2003 1986 0.740 0.567
2004 1987 0.738 0.561
2005 1988 0.741 0.563
2006 1989 0.756 0.569
2007 1990 0.769 0.565
Source: Longitudinal Social Security Records
Wun(16-45)/Wmed(25-45): Ratio of the wages of unskilled workers (average 16-45) to mid-skill levels
Wmed(16-45)/Wsk(25-45): Ratio of wages of mid skill workers to high skill workers
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Table 3: The response of schooling attainment at age 25 to return to skill at age 17 -males
Estimation method: Probit
> Primary Primary school Voc. training HS+
Panel A: Full sample (covariates: province and year dummies)
1. Wage unsk./medskill -.018 .012 -.0166 .0057
(.08)** (.011) (.0087)* (.014)
2. Wage med /High skill -.002 .0036 .007 -.011
(.07) (.0058) (.007) (.008)
3. Uunskilled/Uskilled -.003 .002 -.0007 -.0015
(.0017)* (.0016) (.001) (.0022)
Number of observations
Panel B: Coresidents ( covariates: former plus family size and parental backgound)
4. Wage unsk./medskill -.021 .018 -.023 .006
 at 17 (.09)** (.011)* (.010)** (.014)
5. Wage med/high skill -.072 .009 .008 -.017
 age 17 (.07) (.006) (.008) (.08)**
6. Uunskilled/Uskilled -.002 .0016 .0002 -.0018
(.002) (.0019) (.0014) (.0023)
Number of observations:
Panel C: Coresidents (covariates: former plus province-level trends)
7. Wage unsk./Wage medskill at age 17 .017 -.029 .013
(.013) (.012)** (.017)
8. Wage med sk./Wage high skill at age 17 .013 .003 -.017
(.008) (.008) (.09)*
9. Unemployment rate (unskilled/skilled) .0015 0 -.0015
(.002) (.0013) (.0025)
Multinomial logit
46135
38982
Source: own computations using the Spanish Employment Survey (EPA, 1995-2009) merged with wages in the Registry of Social Security records (years 1987-2001).
The coefficients shown are marginal effects of an increase in 10 percentage points in the ratio  of bargained wages detailed in each row on the probability of achieving 
the educational outcome shown in the relevant column.  Coefficients are evaluated for a young adult interviewed in Madrid, born in 1974 and, in Panels B and C living 
with both parents where the mother has high school. All specifications include province and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the province level
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Each unit observation is a province-year unit. The dependent variable is the ratio of unskilled wages (laborers, according to the Social Security
classification) and mid-skill levels (groups 3-8, in that same category). Covariates are bargained wages for for the skill and industry level shown 
in each covariate. All specifications include year and province dummies. Standard errors clustered at the province level.
Table 4: Actual wages and wages in collective agreements
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Wage laborers /Wage mid-skill -- .137 .132 -- -.109
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) (.061) (.07) (.031)
2. Wage mid-skill /Wage top skill -- -- -.0467 .073 .029
(.064) (.044) (.049)
3. Laborers in construction .0187
(.0057)
4. Laborers in services to industries -.0016
(.0030)
5. Laborers in retail .0030
(.0003)
6. Laborers in metal -.0041
(.0055)
7. Laborers, rest of industries .0122
(.0069)
Constant .559 .519 .559 .535 .639
(.089) (.048) (.058) (.027) (.054)
Number of observations: 365 365 274 275 275
 mid- to high skill wages
Ratio ofRatio of
unskilled to mid-skill wages
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Source: own computations using the Spanish Employment Survey (EPA, 2001-2009) merged with wages in the Registry of collective agreements (1993-2001)
Estimation method: Multinomial Logit. The coefficients shown are marginal effects of an increase in 10 percentage points in the ratio of bargained wages  
in each row on the probability of achieving the educational outcome shown in the relevant column. All specifications include province and year dummies, 
and the ratio of the unemployment rate of unskilled to skilled workers in the province.
The responses are evaluated for a young adult interviewed in Madrid, born in 1974 and, in Panels B and C living with both parents  and whose mother has high 
Table 5A: Schooling attainment at age 25 and return to skill at age 17 -MALES, measures with collective agreements
Probit
>Primary Primary school Voc. training HS+
Panel A: Full sample (covariates: province and year dummies)
1. Wage laborers / Wage mid-skill (17) -.065 .055 .010 -.065
 (.018)** (.015)** (.020) (.025)**
2. Wage mid-skill / Wage top skill (17) .006 .001 .036 -.0375
 (.015) (.010) (.015)** (.015)**
Cases:
Panel B:Coresidents (covariates: former plus education of mother)
3. Wage laborers / -.058  .017 .0166 -.034
mid-skill (17) (.024)** (.007)** (.029) (.017)**
4. Wage mid-skill / .005 .003 .0268 -.030
top skill at age 17 (.02) (.005) (.009)** (.010)**
Number of observations:
Panel C: Coresidents (covariates:former plus provincial trends)
5. Wage laborers -.064 .040 .020 -.060
 /Wage mid-skill  at age 17 (.023)** (.018)** (.022) (.030)**
6. Wage mid-skill .00 .0035 .015 -.017
/Wage top skill  at age 17 (.026) (.015) (.023) (.027)
Number of observations:
Panel D: Adjusting for unemployment (provincial trends, coresidents)
7. Wage laborers (1-Uunsk) / -.030 .024 .018 -.043
Wage mid-skill (1-Umidsk) (.020) (.010)** (.010)* (.017)**
8. Wage mid skill (1-Umidsk) / .00 .004 .006 -.010
Wage top-skill (1-Utopsk) (.018) (.007) (.0067) (.0099)
Number of observations:
21014
21014
16955
Multinomial Logit
25419
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Source: own computations using the Spanish Employment Survey (EPA, 2001-2009) merged with wages in the Registry of collective agreements (1993-2001)
Estimation method: Multinomial Logit. The coefficients shown are marginal effects of an increase in 10 percentage points in the ratio of bargained wages  
in each row on the probability of achieving the educational outcome shown in the relevant column. All specifications include province and year dummies, 
and the ratio of the unemployment rate of unskilled to skilled workers in the province.
The responses are evaluated for a young adult interviewed in Madrid, born in 1974 and, in Panels B and C living with both parents  and whose mother has high 
Table 5B: Schooling attainment at age 25 and return to skill at age 17 -MALES, including statutory wage growth
Probit
>Primary Primary school Voc. training HS+
Panel A: Full sample (covariates: province trends and year dummies)
1. Wage laborers / -.062 .048 .040 -.089
 Wage mid-skill (17) (.029)** (.031) (.032) (.046)**
2. Wage mid-skill / -.02 .01 .00 -.015
 Wage top skill (17) (.02) (.016) (.018) (.018)
Number of observations:
Panel B: Coresidents, mother with basic schooling (covariates: provincial trends)
3. Wage laborers /Wage mid-skill .066 .020 -.087
at age 17 (.030)** (.044) (.058)
4. Wage mid-skill /Wage top skill .028 -.016 -.012
at age 17 (.030) (.044) (.048)
Panel C: Coresident, mother with high school (provincial trends)
7. Wage laborers / .018 .033 -.051
Wage mid-skill (.007)** (.025) (.029)*
8. Wage mid skill / .011 -.008 -.002
Wage top-skill (.006) (.0235) (.025)
Number of observations: 17647
Multinomial Logit
18330
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Table 6: The response of schooling attainment of females to the return to skill at age 17 -measured using collective agreements
Primary school Vocational training HS+
Panel A: Full sample (province and year dummies) (1) (2) (3)
1. Wage laborers /Wage mid-skill at age 17 -.0236 .006 .0174
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) (.0161) (.013) (.0226)
2. Wage mid-skill /Wage top skill at age 17 .0042 .005 -.009
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) (.018) (.007) (.021)
Number of observations:
Panel B:Coresidents (covariates: former plus education of mother)
3. Wage laborers /Wage mid-skill at age 17 -.003 .0057 -.0023
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) (.0043) (.0092) (.0115)
4. Wage mid-skill /Wage top skill at age 17 .00036 .0099 -.0096
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) (.0045) (.0048)** (.0081)
Panel C:Coresidents (covariates: former plus province trends)
3. Wage laborers /Wage mid-skill at age 17 -.003 .0057 -.0023
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) (.0043) (.0092) (.0115)
4. Wage mid-skill /Wage top skill at age 17 -.0005 .0073 -.0068
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) (.0045) (.0045)* (.0057)
Number of observations:
23532
17647
See notes to Table 5B
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Source: combined sample of the Spanish Employment Survey (years 2001-2009) and the Registry of collective agreements. 
Each entry in Panel A (B) contains the percentage of males attaining that schooling level by age 25 in the sample used in Table 5A Panel A (B)
Table 7: The magnitude of the impacts: attainment of cohorts 1978  on with 1978  (males)
1978 1984 Difference: 1978 1984 Difference:
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (5) (6) = (5) - (4)
Panel A: Full sample
1. Primary school 33.2 36.0 2.8 34.2 36.0 1.8
2. Vocational training 22.1 23.0 .9 23.4 23.0 -.4
3. Upper secondary (or higher) 44.6 40.9 -3.7 42.4 40.9 -1.5
Panel B: Sample of coresidents
1. Primary school 29.8 33.2 3.4 31.2 33.2 2.0
2. Vocational training 22.6 23.8 1.2 24.1 23.8 -.3
3. Upper secondary (or higher) 47.5 43.0 -4.5 44.8 43.0 -1.8
Schooling attainment of cohort Schooling of cohort 1984 with returns of
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Table 8: The response of enrolment (ages 16-18) to changes in the perceived wage structure.
Dependent variable:
Full sample Coresident Full sample Coresident 
Estimation method: 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Wage laborers /Wage mid-skill -.0075 -.0059 -.0052 -.0021
(service+construction+retail+metal+rest) ( .0039)* (.0036)* (.0036) (.0036)
2. Unemployment in the province -.019 .018 -.022 .0069
(.034) (.029) (.038) (.0298)
3. Mother completed basic school -.22 -.232
(.01) (.011)
4. Mother completed high school -.07 -.086
(.008) (.012)
5. Mother completed college .087 .166
(.008) (.017)
6. Only father present in household -.006 -.024
(.022) (.019)
7. Only mother present in household -.088 -.110
(.019) (.018)
8. Constant .873 .964
(.038) (.047)
Province dummies? yes yes yes yes
Year dummies? yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 88352 84306 88352 84306
OLS Probit
1 if enrolled in school, ages 16 - 18; 0 otherwise
Source: Spanish Employment Survey (EPA): waves 1993-2001 merged with wage information from
the Registry of Collective Agreements -sample of provincial agreements.
Sample of young males, ages 16-18. Coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are marginal effects of an 
increase in the ratio of unskilled wages to med-skill of 10% for a young adult living in Madrid
 and born in 1976 and, in columns 2 and 4 living with both parents in a household with four 
members where the mother has a high school degree.
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Table A.1: The correspondance between schooling systems, before and after 1999 law
14/1970 Act, changed in 1990 14/1990 Act (first cohort fully affected: 1983)
Pre-1990 system Post-1999 system
Ages Degree Academic track Vocational track Degree Academic track Vocational track
23
22
21
20
19
18 College
17 Pre-University 1 2
16 3 1
15 2
14 1
13 8
12 7
11 6
10 5
9 4
8 3
7 2
6 1
2nd grade
1st grade
College
Secondary education
1rst cycle
2nd cycle
3rd cycle
3rd grade
3rd cycle
2nd cycle
1rst cycle
2nd cycle
Compulsory sec. School
Upper secondary
Primary education
1st cycle
1st grade
2nd grade
1st cycle
2nd cycle
3rd cycle
Primary education
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Table A.2. Correspondence skill groups-schooling group
Skill groups Our notation Schooling
Social Security definition
1 College graduates
2 2-year college degree
3 Managers
4 Clerical workers, no college degree
5 Clerical workers, rest
6 Supporting clerical staff 1
7 Supporting clerical staff 2
8 Craftsmen, 1
9 Craftsmen, 2
10 Laborers Unskilled Basic schooling
11 Workers below the age of 18 not used not used
High-skill College
Mid-skill Vocational training/upper secondary
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
42
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1208
Table A.3. The determinants of wage growth in collective agreements: lagged unemployment rate
Construction Retail Metal Rest of industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates: One-year lagged unemployment rate:
1. Urate 16-25 years old -239.56 -18 9.981 92.00
(184.17) (148.70) (181.079) (150.16)
2. Urate 26-35 years old -10.22 112 -130.88 -9.722
(298.77) (238) (305.715) (241.36)
3. Urate 36-45 years old -600.41 -684.09 62.004 -346.67
(343.5)* (276.11)** (336.82) (276.00)
4. Urate 46-55 years -755.62 -107.47 -358.558 -404.47
(312.9)** (250.37) (308.055) (254.13)*
Number of observations 323 342 329 350
R-squared .337 .31 .312 .336
Dependent variable: yearly wage growth in the agreement (percentage points*100)
Sample: Merged data set of Spanish Employment Survey and Registry of Collective Agreements
The measure of unemployment rate refers to adults with education at the primary level of less and varies between 0 and 1. 
Wage growth is measured in  percentage points multiplied by 100,  ie, 1000 reflects a 10% wage increase.
The estimation method: weighted least squares, where weights are the number of workers in the province
The unit of observation is the year-province. Sample 1995-1999. Additional regressors are province and year dummies. 
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Figure 1A: Educational attainment at age 25 by year of birth, 
male Spanish citizens 
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Figure 1B: Educational attainment at age 25, by year of birth: 
female Spanish citizens 
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Source: EPA (Spanish Employment Survey), years 1992-2009
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Figure 2: Wage structure by skill level at age 17, by year of birth: 
Spanish males  
Wage laborers/Wage mid-skill  
Wage mid skill/Wage college 
Source: Social Security Registers: 1989-2007
a. Wage of laborers are medians among group 10 workers aged 16-45 years in province-year. We take medians in three age cells (16-26, 26-35, 35-45) 
and average them
b. Wage of mid-skill workers are medians among groups 3-9 of workers aged 25-45 age in province-year. We take medians in two age cells and 
average them
c. Wage of college workers are medians among groups 1-2 of workers in 25-45 age in province-year. We take medians in three age cells and average 
them
(16-26, 26-35, 35-45) and average them
av rage them
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Figure 5: Bargained nominal wage growth in construction and in the rest of the industries
Source: Registry of Collective Agreements 1990-2001
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